This paper explores the effects of official creditor subsidies to private lenders on loan pricing and credit availability. A two-period model is developed which includes a private lender, a sovereign borrower and an official creditor. The presence of credible sovereign collateral is shown to be critical to the behavior of the official creditor, even though the collateral need never be seized. The probability of sovereign default is derived in a formal way. The "kiss of death" occurs when official creditor participation does not reduce the probability of default by enough to outweigh the increase in the expected loss to the private lender if default occurs. The result becomes stronger the riskier the sovereign borrower. The model suggests a different, more supervisory role for official creditors, particularly the IMF.
Introduction
Several large bailouts by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) over the last five years have called into question the role of the IMF in alleviating financial crises in developing countries 4 . On one side are critics who argue that IMF bailouts simply provide free insurance for developed country private lenders. This introduces moral hazard as sovereign borrowers and private lenders are encouraged to undertake marginal investment projects that would not be undertaken without the promise of an IMF intervention (Schultz, Simon and Wriston (1998) ). Schwartz (1998) argues that the IMF is not needed to provide discipline (monitoring) to prevent financial crises, rather that private markets provide the ultimate discipline and do it more effectively and quickly than the IMF. Feldstein (1998) further adds that the IMF is overstepping its mandate in the Asian crisis by tying the provision of new loans to banking reforms, as well as the usual mix of fiscal and monetary policies. Some other criticisms of the IMF and IMF programs are found in Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Sachs (1998) .
Supporters of the IMF's recent programs generally argue that the crumbling economies the IMF supports would have been far worse off without the help of the IMF. They also suggest that the IMF serves an important role as a lender of last resort. Supporters here are Krugman (1998) , Fischer (1999) and Masson and Mussa (1997) . Calomiris (1998) points out that the IMF cannot be a lender of last resort in the same sense as a central bank as it does not have the ability to create high powered money. Even so, it may be able to make loans with fewer constraints than any individual lending nation.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the effect of IMF participation during financial crises using a simple two period model of a private lender and a sovereign borrower. While the IMF does provide other services that might be valued in private credit markets 5 , the focus in this paper is the role of the IMF in providing loan subsidies in the event of a crisis. Moral hazard is not a feature of our model. Krugman (1999) points out that the bulk of private flows to developing countries over the last decade have been foreign direct investment, which is targeted by the foreign parent company, not the local government.
Many other models of the borrower-lender relationship have been explored in the literature (Eaton and Gersovitz (1980) , Cooper and Sachs (1985) , Bulow and Rogoff (1989) are representative of important contributions). With the exception of Bhattachrya and Detragiache (1994) , generally third party official institutions are excluded from the formal structure of these models. In the next section, we develop a framework in which the IMF participates in the international lending market during a financial crisis up to the point at which even the IMF has no hope of recovering any funds 6 . We see this as a novel feature in the modeling of international lending. This characterization of the IMF drives many of the results.
We treat the IMF as a representative official lender. Traditionally the role of the IMF has been to focus on short-term balance of payments problems that require temporary financing, while the World Bank has focused on medium-term lending for development projects. That distinction has become blurred since the Baker and Brady Plans, which emphasized both the IMF and the World Bank as providers of mediumterm financial assistance. It is now recognized that the promise of successful medium-term development requires short-term balance of payments stability and vice-versa. Private lenders are treated as different from official lenders as they typically commit the majority of a joint private-official lending package.
Terms for private loans are more onerous than official loans: the interest rate is higher, maturity is shorter, and the proportion of the loan deemed as concessional is much smaller.
The next section sets up the basic assumptions of the model, which includes a sovereign borrower, a private lender, and the IMF. The third section provides solutions for the endogenous variables and the "kiss of death" result: the presence of an IMF commitment tied into a private loan can accelerate a financial crisis for sovereign borrowers with little credible collateral. The fourth section suggests a different role for the IMF that is superior to both the sovereign borrower and private lender in the model and may be more workable than some of the suggestions made in the literature to improve the workings of capital markets in crises.
Setting up the model
The market for private lenders is perfectly competitive. All loans are priced at the LIBOR (r) plus a fixed interest spread s, which is determined by the market demand and supply for loans. The spread may differ for each sovereign borrower depending upon their risk characteristics. The lender's problem is to determine the optimal market spread s j at which to lend to sovereign borrower j to maximize expected profits. All loans mature in two periods. By assumption, half of the total loan amount is dispersed at the beginning of each period with half of the principal and interest payments due at the end of each period.
The Sovereign Borrower
The sovereign borrower is assumed to use all of the borrowed funds to purchase capital 7 . Half of the desired capital is purchased at the beginning of period one and the other half at the beginning of period two (K 1 and K 2 ). The borrower will purchase capital at the constant price P K in a perfectly competitive capital market up to the point where the value of the marginal product of capital just equals its marginal cost 8 . For simplicity, the long run production function exhibits constant returns to scale and is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas. N is the labour stock used for the investment project(s) associated with the loan.
Unanticipated shocks to the production function are captured in u, which is defined to be log-normal. Thus output, Q, depends upon a stochastic shock, capital and labour.
The shock can originate from many sources. A rapid change in technology will have the right effect, but is not likely the sole cause of Asia's problems. There are two likely scenarios for the shock. First a rapid depreciation (devaluation) in the currency vis-a-vis the US dollar causes a negative u shock through higher domestic inflation and higher wage demands. These higher wage demands reduce the optimal labor input and lower the marginal product of capital. A second approach sees the rapid depreciation in the currency lowering the US dollar price of the firm's output, making it more difficult to service US dollar denominated debts (L 1 and L 2 ). Now the international value of the marginal product of capital schedule shifts inward, but in this case due to the lower US dollar price of the firm's output. Irresponsible domestic monetary policy also creates the same effect. In the second approach, the shock should be "attached" to the price of the firm's output, not the output itself, but our approach yields qualitatively identical results.
All sovereign borrowers are assumed to face the same production function. Solving for the expected value of the marginal product of capital (VMP K ), where P is the price of the output and x = µ + σ 2 /2, gives
Since the marginal cost of the loan to country j, ρ j = r + s j , is expressed as a rate of return, the yield on a unit of capital expressed as a rate of return is
Sovereign borrowers will borrow funds and purchase capital up to the point where the value of the marginal product of capital just equals ρ in each period. Solving (3) for the borrower's demand for capital
The lender declares the loan to be in default if any portion of the principle or interest owing is not paid. The two periods are illustrated in Figure 1 .
Default and Collateral
Due to the two period nature of the model, collateral will be required to insure that any loans will be made at all. Without collateral, the borrower will always default when the period two payment is due since there are no default costs in future periods. As long as the value of the collateral, expressed as a share savings (including government savings). That could also be the case here, but our approach focuses on how the market for foreign loans is determined, not on how domestic investment and savings are optimized.
θ of the second period capital stock, is greater than the second period interest payment due, θK 2 >ρK 2 , the sovereign borrower will never default. The form of the collateral could be a seizure of export revenues, foreign assets, some other capture, or exclusion from future credit. If the loss of the collateral is seen as a credible outcome for the sovereign borrower, default will never occur, hence the exact nature of the collateral need not be outlined here.
Default would never occur in the model as set up so far if realized output is equal to expected output, e u = e
x . An optimal loan rate ρ j would be established by all lenders based on the market demand and supply for loans to borrower j. The borrower chooses the size of the desired loan L j at rate ρ j to purchase capital at price P K. The lender disburses the loan in two periods and collects a return over the two periods in a timely fashion. The borrower collects the quasi-rents from the use of the purchased capital. Default risk is zero with the presence of credible collateral greater than ρK 2 in value.
A large negative u 1 shock will shift the MP K schedule downward in period one and may prevent the borrower from making the required interest payment. The lender then declares the loan to be in default and does not release the period two disbursement 9 . It is assumed the lender then collects whatever payment the borrower can make at the end of period one. The possibility of default will partly determine the market spread charged to borrower j.
Default occurs when the quasi-rent from purchasing capital is less than the required interest payment.
where Q' is the realized level of output in period one. This can be rewritten for the point at which default is declared.
Substituting the borrower's demand for capital from (4) gives
9 This is consistent with the definition of default provided in Easton and Rockerbie (1999a) . Simplifying (7) leaves the condition for default as a function of the technology, the loan rate and the realized and expected shocks to production
The Consequent Probability of Default
The condition for default in (8) leads naturally to a working characterization of the probability of default. That is, the probability of default arises within the model without the need to assume additional ad hoc stochastic structure -logit, probit or whatever 10 . If the quasi-rent becomes negative at the end of period one, default is declared. This will occur with probability π (where σ − = ( )
It is worth noting in (9) that increases in the loan rate ρ decrease Z x , and raise the probability of default ( ρ ∂ π ∂ >0). This result is consistent with one of the key insights of Stiglitz and Weiss (1980) , that the probability of default and the loan rate are endogenous.
The IMF
The IMF enters the model by providing a subsidy to the borrower to meet interest payments in the event of default. The IMF's objective is to maintain the smooth functioning of world capital markets, which in our model means that the probability of default is reduced and the extent of borrowing is increased. The subsidy offered, γ, is a proportion of the amount of debt service owed at the end of period one. In addition to the contracted amount owed to the private lender, the borrower must pay back the subsidy at the end of period two. Initially we assume that the IMF charges the LIBOR, r, on the subsidy. If the IMF's 10 The relationship between the probability of default and loan pricing has been modeled in a number of papers (Eaton and Gersovitz 1980 , Edwards 1984 , 1986 and Easton and Rockerbie 1999a . Surveys of earlier attempts can be found in Saini and Bates (1984) and Eaton and Taylor (1986) . A more recent survey is Rockerbie (1993) .
opportunity cost of funds is also r, the interest rate on the subsidy is concessional when discounted to the first period.
The upper limit of the IMF subsidy, γ , is a direct function of the amount of collateral put up by the borrower 11 . In Figure 1 , the amount of subsidy provided by the IMF at the end of period one is γ(1+ρ)L.
The discounted difference between the second period collateral, θ, and required private debt service, ρL, is δ(θ−ρ)P K K = δ(θ−ρ)L, where δ is a discount factor. The borrower will choose to default in the second period, and give up the collateral, if the IMF subsidy exceeds the second period collateral. This sets a maximum value for the IMF's participation as a function of the level of private collateral, the lending rate and the discount factor. Consequently, the magnitude of the IMF subsidy, γ, is constrained,
At the start of period one, the IMF commits γ , which is determined by the collateral of the borrower, and market conditions. They will disburse a value of γ up to γ at the end of period one. With the participation of the IMF, default now occurs when the realized value of the required subsidy is greater than γ . Clearly IMF participation reduces the probability of default for the private lender. The condition for default and the probability of default are now
If the IMF provides complete insurance on the loan ( 1 = γ ), the value for π falls to zero since (12) reduces to
which cannot occur.
The Private Lender
The representative private lender is assumed to maximize expected profit from the two period loan. For simplicity, equal loan disbursements are made in each period. The lender's problem is to determine the optimal spread above LIBOR, s, based on risk characteristics of the sovereign borrower and the expectation of IMF participation. The lender views IMF participation
) as a form of free partial insurance. In the event of default ( γ ≥ γ ), the lender recovers whatever is left from the borrower's realized output at the end of the first period, , PQ' and cancels the second period disbursement. We assume that collateral cannot be seized at the end of the first period.
Solving the Model
The objective functions of the borrower, lender and the IMF respectively are given below.
Borrower:
The borrower maximizes expected quasi-rents in (13). This is the sum of the quasi-rent in period one and the discounted quasi-rent in period two, less the expected discounted loss of quasi-rent from the second period in the event of default at the end of the first period. The term ϕ is the fraction of the second period quasi-rent that is a true deadweight loss to the borrowing country, since some fraction of the labor devoted to the investment project, (1-ϕ)N may find employment elsewhere. The maximization problem in (13) reduces to
Maximizing (13') results in the same solution for K* as (4).
In (14), the private lender maximizes the expected profit from the two loan disbursements in the event of no default, plus the expected debt service payment that can be claimed at the end of the first period in the event of default ( γ ≥ γ ). Differentiating (14) by L and solving for the market spread s j gives (dropping subscripts for convenience)
The objective function of the IMF in (15) is simplistic: the IMF wishes to make a market for the lender and borrower through the effect of a subsidy on the probability of default. The IMF faces an opportunity cost of funds r in the first period, but is paid back the same opportunity cost in the second period. The expected loss to the IMF due to discounting second period receipts is the concessional feature of their subsidies 12 . The first order condition from (15) gives
The derivative in (17) does carry a negative sign as is clear from (12) 13 . A solution for γ can be found as a function of its elasticity on π.
In (18), η is the absolute value of the elasticity of π with respect to γ.
If the borrower puts up more collateral in the second period of the loan, the IMF will be able to provide a greater subsidy. This raises γ which lowers π through (12). The effect of greater collateral on the optimal interest spread s* and the size of the loan in the first period is not immediately apparent. From (16)
With γ ∂ π ∂ < 0, the sign of γ ∂ ∂ * s depends on the sign of the first bracketed term in the numerator of (19). The result in (19) will be positive if 12 This need not be the case. The IMF could receive a rate of return higher than r in the second period. This would not change the qualitative results of the model. 13 We have
The implication of this result is that for risky borrowers (high π, low γ ), participation by the IMF serves to increase the lender's optimal loan spread, which lowers the size of the optimal loan. This clearly makes the borrower worse off in the no default state. The lender is worse off since expected profit is being maximized along a smaller profit locus. This is the "kiss of death". The intuition behind the result is subtle.
In the no default state, where a negative shock is not large enough to satisfy (12), the private lender does not care where the debt service comes from (the borrower or the IMF) as long as it is made. This will not affect the lender's expected profit in (14). By providing a 1 0 < γ < γ < , the IMF reduces the probability of default π. Defaults are now avoided until γ = γ . This serves to raise the expected profit for the lender in (14). Unfortunately the reduction in π is not enough to offset the lower seizure of product by the lender if γ ≥ γ . Overall, the expected profit for the lender is reduced. The IMF presence during a financial crisis may lower the probability of default marginally, but private lenders take a bath if the IMF gives up. In expectation of this, private lenders tighten credit and raise spreads to countries in crisis, further exacerbating the crisis. It may be more profitable for lenders to discourage IMF participation and simply seize the available output in the event of default at the end of period one. The amount that can be seized when the IMF does not participate is greater than the available output if the IMF does participate. This would depend on the ability of private creditors to seize the available output, which may be weak.
The "kiss of death" result does not hold for all sovereign borrowers. Low risk countries with large amounts of credible collateral (low π, high γ ) may violate condition (20). The point is the higher the collateral put up by the borrower, the lower the probability of default with IMF participation. At some critical level of collateral and, given market conditions, the "kiss of death" result will not hold. The critical level will vary by sovereign borrower.
A Role for the IMF
The results of this simple model suggest that the practice of the IMF of providing partial loan subsidies in times of financial crisis may serve to make the onset of the crisis more likely. The optimal response of the private lender is to raise the spread charged on new loans and reduce the loan size at the start of period one. The private lender perceives a reduction in the expected value of any loan to the sovereign borrower since, with IMF assistance, the increase in the magnitude of the loss in the event of a default outweighs the reduction in the probability of a default. This is the "kiss of death" result: when the IMF commits to the loan in a big way, the private lender is in big trouble if a default occurs.
It is easy to see from the private lenders maximization problem in (14) that the optimal maximum amount of IMF commitment is 1 = γ , therefore π = 0. The private lender's loan is fully insured with no risk of loss in the event of default. The sovereign borrower may also prefer this commitment since, through the violation of the static condition in (20), the private lender will not raise the interest spread nor reduce the loan size at the start of period one. How could such a commitment for the IMF be made workable?
Certainly the IMF would have to change the way it operates in times of financial crisis.
In this model, the IMF provides a very odd type of insurance. A small debt-servicing problem (small γ's) is covered by the IMF, with no deductible for the private lender. A large negative shock, which results in a huge loss for the private lender ( γ > γ ), is not covered by the IMF. This is the opposite of a standard private insurance contract where small losses must be partially absorbed by the losing party (the private lender) due to the enforcement of a deductible. On the other hand, large losses to the losing party are fully covered if deemed legitimate. With the existing system, private lenders are taking write downs on bad loans, sovereign borrowers are suffering large losses in real income and the IMF is running out of funds to lend. Some suggested remedies have been debt-equity swaps, exit bonds, the Tobin tax and an option purchased by the borrower to extend the maturity of a loan in times of a crisis (Buiter and Sibert (1999) ). All of these measures seem like band-aid solutions for a crisis management system that does not work.
The model developed in this paper suggests a different solution. Require the lead banks in syndicated lending to join the IMF, just as official lenders are members of the IMF. Private members would be required to pay insurance premiums in the form of annual subscriptions proportional to the amount of syndicated lending requiring IMF insurance. If a sovereign borrower is unable to meet the required debt service on a private member's loan for legitimate reasons, the IMF will make the required payments to the private member, less a deductible. The optimal "premium" plus choice of deductible amount could be determined using similar methods used for other forms of private insurance. Of course the optimal interest spread charged may rise as private lenders try to pass on the costs of IMF insurance to sovereign borrowers, but this may be offset by the removal of the negative effect of partial IMF insurance outlined in the model.
Conditions may still need to be attached to "IMF endorsed" private loans to insure the borrower does not take advantage of the full insurance feature (moral hazard).
The insurance system would give the IMF influence over the short and long-term portfolios of private lenders almost equivalent to a central bank. If the IMF believes that the international exposure of a private member to a particular sovereign borrower, region or the entire portfolio is too high, the IMF could raise the premium, increase the deductible, or both. In this way, the IMF can affect crises before they occur and mitigate international portfolio transactions in a way they cannot do now.
Current IMF policy seems to deal with crises on a country-specific basis with no overall global strategy. The IMF under Bretton Woods acted globally to enforce a system of fixed exchange rates up to 1971. The system worked until member countries outgrew the system. The IMF should continue to focus on developing a global system to deal with financial crises rather than on inconsistent country-specific programs. A system of IMF insurance requiring leading private creditors to join, side by side with official creditors, might be a feasible step in that direction. 
